Abstract: This paper is based on my presentation given as part of a panel discussion at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the American Accounting Association in August 2012 in Washington DC. To the other panellists' papers (Glover, 2013; Zeff, 2013b ) I add a contrasting perspective from other countries (primarily the UK and the rest of Europe) that incorporates a variety of other actors and differing uses (or 'objectives') of financial accounting and reporting. I consider briefly in turn: the major actors; major external uses of financial reports; the 'rational institutional myths' that sustain the role of accounting standards; and the potential contributions both of research and of university accounting education. I argue that 'positive' and 'normative' research, reflecting a deep understanding of accounting's history, must continue to be complementary in the social engineering of better accounting standards and rules.
Introduction
The other papers in this set focus on the US and the respective roles of the FASB and of the accounting academics, considering how far they "traded places" around the 1970s such that the standard setters (previously "positive", i.e. starting from current "generally accepted" practices) became "normative" (i.e. starting from some theory or Conceptual Framework ("CF") of what would be "the best" financial accounting and reporting) while the academics (previously normative) became positive -and thereby retreated from their earlier focus on advising standard setters how best to "narrow the areas of difference in accounting practice" (Zeff, 2013b, p. 3) . As individual researchers, academics have aspired to become "social scientists" rather than "social engineers" (Glover, 2013, p. 4) , although the AAA's Financial Accounting Standards Committee has continued to offer collective opinions on the merits of proposed FASB standards (Zeff, 2013b, p. 2) . 1 Rather than give my own version of what happened and what the consequences have been in the US, I aim here to add a contrasting perspective from other countries (primarily the UK and the rest of Europe) that incorporates a variety of other actors and differing uses (or "objectives") of financial accounting and reporting. I consider briefly in turn: the major actors; major external uses of financial reports; the "rational institutional myths" that sustain the role of accounting standards; and the potential contributions both of research and of university accounting education.
Major actors
In the "regulatory space" of accounting there are a number of competing major actors that influence each other (e.g. Freeman & Rossi, 2012) and over time, as one would expect, their respective roles and interrelationships have changed and are still changing. It is not only standard setters and academics that are important. Prominent groups include: -The background "regulatory agencies" (such as the SEC -as emphasized by Zeff (2013b) -the EU Commission, or the Chinese Ministry of Finance) that to a greater or lesser extent delegate their powers to standard setters such as FASB/ IASB.
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-The background legal systems that settle disputes arising from accounting and auditing according to each jurisdiction's framework, e.g. of common law or code law (e.g. Watts, 2006; Leuz, 2010 ). -Competition and prudential regulators. For example, in the UK Lord Turner, the chairman of the Financial Services Authority, reflecting concerns over the role of Fair Value ("FV") in the banking crisis, has argued that banks need different accounting rules to other entities given the systemic risks they carry (Turner, 2010) , and this view has more recently been supported by a senior official of the Bank of England, referring to the "fog" of bank accounting under current IFRS (Haldane, 2012 ). -Politicians (national and international), for example, the intervention of President Chirac of France requiring the EU's "carve out" from IAS 39 (e.g. Walton, 2007, p. 179) ; the concerns of the G20 over accounting's role in the recent financial crisis 3 ; and the likely interest of the Chinese Government, and therefore of the other countries, in the amendment to IAS24 to exclude "state-controlled entities" from related party disclosures.
4
-Managers, both for internal management needs and for reporting externally. In the UK, they increasingly report their version of "core earnings" as a "more realistic" supplement (and thereby challenge) to their IFRS earnings (as US firms do with "pro forma' earnings"). They may also form industry "coalitions", not only temporarily for lobbying on proposed standards but more long-term for developing their own codes of reporting practices as, for example, banks (Macve & Chen, 2010) and insurance companies (Serafeim, 2011) have done; or they may collaborate more widely across all industries (e.g. the UK's Hundred Group of Finance Directors [Broadley, 2007] ) or internationally, for example, in developing global codes for voluntary environmental and social responsibility reporting through initiatives such as the "GRI".
5
2 Government influence in the UK has been exercised primarily through representatives of what was originally the Board of Trade and is now the Department for Business Innovation and Skills and its Financial Reporting Council (www.gov.uk/bis) with their responsibilities for company law and accounting and auditing standards. Perhaps its most conspicuous intervention was the setting up of the Sandilands Committee on inflation accounting (which reported in 1975) to forestall the accounting profession's own initiative in PSSAP7 (Zeff, 2013a -Auditors and related global consulting firms (increasingly run as primarily multinational businesses with professional duties attached, e.g. Zeff, 2003) who in addition to their technical views have their own business interests in the nature of standards from various perspectives, including potential audit liability (which differs across different jurisdictions). They may have mixed incentives, for example, the costs of training of their own staff favour simplicity and international comparability in standards; while the potential for earning high fees from advising clients and training their staff favours conceptual and technical complexity. -Professional accounting bodies who develop their own "thought leadership" programmes and related conferences and publications, often involving academics.
6
-Information intermediaries such as the analysts and the (financial) press. They may have varying views, e.g. the CFA Institute favours FV; CRUF favours a model closer to that argued for by Penman (2007 Penman ( , 2011 ) -e.g. Cooper (2007) .
7
-"Users" including investors, lenders and other stakeholders: to be discussed further in Section 3 below. -Academics (as researchers and teachers): to be discussed further in Sections 5 and 6 below. But we might note that academics, when offering "expert" commentaries on standards, may have a vested interest in their complexity too.
All these actors, and the interactions between them, shape to differing degrees the way that accounting "problems" are identified (e.g. for the standard setters' agendas) and then debated so that, insofar as the standard setters and academics have "traded places" over time, this will also have reflected changes in the views and influence of the constellation of other actors. All these would have been influenced to differing degrees by a myriad of "external" factors such as the changes in technology (e.g. enabling large sample computer based econometric research from the late 1960s); changes in related theoretical fields (e.g. the emergence of modern "financial economics" following Modigliani and Miller's new approach in the late 1950s -Power, 2010; Morley, 2011); changes in the legal framework (e.g. imposition of large liabilities for environmental damage, which differ across jurisdictions); changes in the market structures (e.g. the deepening of stock markets in Continental Europe and more recently in South East Asia; the emergence of markets in complex financial instruments, many without an identifiable "historical cost"; the escalation of pension rights and liabilities for other post-retirement benefits in labour contracts; the growth of the new IT-based industries; the waxing and waning of mergers and acquisitions ("M&A" activity) with their related problems for consolidation accounting (including valuation of large intangibles)); and macroeconomic factors such as the effect of periods of high inflation on the "realism" of historical costs (as for example in the UK in the 1970s when it averaged 13% a year, and peaked at 25% in 1975, while in the US it also reached over 10% a year and sometimes closer to 15%) 8 or major financial crises (e.g. Waymire & Basu, 2011) .
In evaluating the consequences of changing roles in this regulatory space, one must therefore consider what comparative advantage does each actor have and how that also may have changed relative to other existing and potential actors (e.g. Watts, 2006; Christensen, 2010) . But agonizing over the disjunction between accounting research and practice is a recurring theme (e.g. for the UK, Baxter, 1988; and for Australia, Evans, Burritt, & Guthrie, 2011) .
Major external uses
While the FASB/IASB "objectives" narrow their focus to investment and related decisions primarily by passive investors and lenders trading in developed capital markets, who are primarily interested in information assisting valuation (e.g. Penman, 2011) , other significant historical functions of accounting clearly remain important, which might be collectively labelled "legal" or "control" functions, including stewardship (which has always been ambiguous as to how far it includes accountability for performance over and above honesty) 9 ; contractual "settling up" and taxation, both requiring one "bottom line" number; and regulation e.g. price control, utility rate regulation and prudential regulation of financial institutions (cf. Zeff, 2013a) . While one might think the solution could be to have different accountings for different purposes and different users, "control" and "valuation" inevitably infect each other, primarily through performance measurement and evaluation, so that there is always a trade-off between differing needs and incentives (e.g. Edey, 1978; Christensen, 2010; cf. Macve, 2010) .
8 For UK: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Pages/inflation/timeline/chart.aspx; for US: http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Rate/HistoricalInflation.aspx (both accessed 8 January 2013). 9 As in the "parable of the talents" in St. Matthew's gospel, [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] However, it has been argued by Young (2006) that the type of "rational investors and lenders" given primacy by standard setters has been constructed to legitimate the particular orientation and discourse adopted in their CFs rather than representing the actual real-world sources of authoritative demands for financial reporting. And for these constructed users themselves, why do they need "one number" (for profit/net assets) rather than a range of informative disclosures? Capital markets use and triangulate a variety of information sources, and exploring how their needs are exhibited through market behaviour is now the major focus of empirical research in accounting (and in "an efficient market" accounting recognition and measurement standards themselves may be of relatively low interest). But given the SEC's insistence on "narrowing differences", finding the best "one number" in accounting reports makes conceptual consistency across the elements of financial statements desirable to reduce "accounting arbitrage": so FASB and IASB (2005) now seek "to replace conventions with concepts", seen as essential for legitimating the IFRS (and convergence) agenda, where there is no supervening international regulatory or government authority to mandate international harmonization (although one could consider allowing recognition of alternative systems of standards (e.g. Sunder, 2002) and perhaps requiring reconciliations -but reconciliation to what if there are multiple systems? e.g. Walker, 2010) .
"Rational institutional myths"
Accounting reports (supported by auditing) enable "action at a distance" (whether for example in managing a large, multidivisional and/or multinational business or in deciding to provide external finance through investing in it). But any idea that accounting can report objectively the true financial position and financial performance (and thereby prospects?) of the business, which auditors can verify, is in large part a myth. One has only to consider the AC101 tropes of incorrigible allocations and the subjectivity in accruals for impairment provisions and liabilities, depending inter alia on the selection of "the unit of account" (c.f. FASB/IASB, 2005).
10 "Accounting truth" is a "rational institutional myth" that we 10 So renaming the balance sheet as "a statement of financial position" in the 2007 revision of IAS1 has not of itself increased the validity of any claim that that is what it represents. Given the lack of a coherent theory in the FASB/IASB CF of what is "financial position", "balance sheet" remains a more honest and realistic description of what it contains, namely the accounting outcomes of the variety of often inconsistent recognition and measurement rules, conventions and practices incorporated in current standards (e.g. Macve, 1997; Bromwich, Macve, & Sunder, 2010) . That of course does not mean a balance sheet cannot assist users in their estimates of a firm's "financial position", provided they understand its limitations (e.g. Watts, 2006) .
have all come to take for granted, and which serves to provide the reassurance needed to sustain such risky "action at a distance" that is essential to sustain in turn the modern economic and financial world (McMillan, 1998; Macve, 2013) . Add to this the incentives that managers (as "agents") face to take advantage of the inherent information asymmetry and to favourably colour (if not actually distort) their financial reporting to their "principals" (e.g. Gao, 2013) . Audit may mitigate, but cannot eliminate such "earnings management" given the flexibility within accounting rules and the need for subjective estimates. Indeed, what is regarded as auditable/verifiable is in turn socially constructed (Power, 1996 (Power, , 2010 . As a result much of the value of IFRS (or of US GAAP) may lie more at the "network" level of a reasonably understood, reasonably enforceable system providing a shared infrastructure than in the quality of individual standards or individual firms' audited reports. But such value is difficult to measure and is intertwined with social and political priorities (e.g. Macve, 2010 Macve, , 2013 .
Standard setters' contribution to sustaining the rational myths of accounting and audit lie primarily in providing a due "expert" process that legitimates the system in the eyes of the whole constellation of interested actors. While Positive Accounting Theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990 ) offers explanations of managerial choice within the system, it does not itself explain the available range of acceptable accounting policy choices, where historical path dependency may be as convincing an explanation as rational evolution (if not a more convincing one) for the observed bias in favour of the continuance of long-standing conventions such as "historical cost" and "conservatism" (cf. Watts, 2006) . As with the inefficient QWERTY keyboard, the costs of changing what we have inherited through an accident of mid-nineteenth century timing -legacies that are now embedded in so many organizational and institutional relationships (continually reinforced by current accounting education and skills training) -may now have increasingly become too great to overcome at an acceptable cost even if we did know what the optimal design for the "best" accounting standards would be in what is inevitably a "second best" world (Lipsey & Lancaster, 1956; David, 1985; Sunder, 1997, p. 165; Macve, 2010 Macve, , 2013 .
Research positive and/or normative?
While positive research (especially empirical archival research) has come to dominate the US academic literature and PhD training, Ashton et al. (2009) point out the greater variety of approaches still adopted in the UK. But here too the dominance of the US paradigm is ever increasing given the "top" journal Trading Places rankings assigned to the leading econometrics-focussed North American journals and this is also heavily influencing those developing the discipline in other countries (e.g. now in continental Europe and in South East Asia, including especially China). They thereby now seek to establish accounting's academic credentials, as their own Universities aspire to higher global rankings, whether or not this is the most appropriate and relevant approach for their needs and skills (e.g. Sunder, 2008) . And while positive research is skilful in finding out what is (and hopefully also the explanations for that), I believe it was Robert R. Sterling who pointed out that empirical research among users in relation to road transport in the 1870s would have revealed continuing preferences (subject to cost) for such features as thicker straw on the floor, plumper seat cushions, better springs and maybe faster horses, all of which would enhance the passengers' current environment of horse-drawn carriages; but there could have been no mention then of what they would soon show they "really" wanted, i.e. motor cars (first patented by Karl Benz in 1886). And history (dominated by horsedrawn transport for thousands of years) would not have helped here either (which may explain why Henry Ford thought it was "bunk").
In fact a strong normative streak has re-appeared in the research now targeted on the spread of FV, where "value relevance" and "conservatism" in accounting standards are debated with as much ardour, and as much prescription (e.g. Watts, 2006; Penman, 2007) , as in Glover's (2013) characterization of pre-1970s US research, even though the relevant issue is not so much "FV vs conservatism" but rather "how much conservatism for different purposes and situations?" (Lambert, 2010) .
11 Similarly, recent research on the role of accounting for risk measures has policy implications for standard setting and for the tension between "balance sheet" and "income" approaches (e.g. Ryan, 2012) . And there is no shortage of recommendations in many of the papers cited here on what the shape of international standard setting should be for the future. However, a wider sociological understanding of how accounting shares its role with other calculative techniques and measures (similarly based in "rational institutional myths") is now essential (Chapman, Cooper, & Miller, 2009 ) when considering how to construct and utilize meaningful standardized accounting "performance index numbers" (e.g. ROI), 12 in a world of increasingly powerful indices that, individually and collectively, give governments and other agencies, as well as business firms, the (illusion of?) control at a distance, 13 as well as providing the "proxies" needed for empirical academic research in all social science disciplines.
Education
In considering the role of academics their role in education is perhaps their most important contribution. The majority of their university students proceed to financial and general management rather than higher degrees and research and if they are to "take away" enlightenment that will help them understand and influence future accounting debates, the teaching they receive must reflect the latest research. There should be a reasonably clear division of labour according to comparative advantage: professional education for accounting qualifications must and should be largely technical to equip new practitioners but this should be on a foundation of university degrees that deal with the wider issues and debates, and create a readership for research (as e.g. in the medical, legal and engineering professions). University classes should not be teaching the text-books that simply explicate the rules in current standards (e.g. Zeff, 1982) but opening students' eyes to what are the relevant questions that frame the issues around "what is good accounting and financial reporting?" (e.g. Macve, 1997: Introduction) , otherwise both future standard setters and researchers will remain locked into misunderstandings of accounting's real-world roles and effects (including its unintended consequences).
14 12 ROI and other accounting numbers may need adjusting for "inflation" for comparison over time. But inflation can only be "measured" by choosing how to construct another index, a choice that also has potential wealth-distribution effects. See e.g. http://www.theactuary. com/news/2013/01/keeping-rpi-inflation-measure-unchanged-will-safeguard-pensions/? utm_source=Adestra&utm_medium=email&utm_term (accessed 11 January 2013). 13 Rotttenburg (2012) cites examples of constructions such as IQ (intelligence) and indices including HPI (poverty); HDI (development); RoL Index (rule of law); GII (gender inequality) all of which are central to "problem identification" and then to economic and social policy making, evaluation and research. Furthermore, the pressures to perform in various indices of "global university rankings" also drive institutional priorities for types of academic research and publication (e.g. http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/; http://www.shanghairanking.com/ (both accessed 13 January 2013).
14 An ongoing additional problem in countries like the UK, where there is no requirement for any university education in accounting for entry to the accounting professional bodies such as ICAEW, is how to expand the professional syllabuses to introduce students to the conceptual issues, theoretical perspectives and empirical research evidence that should inform their understanding of the "why" of accounting practices and rules (c.f. Napier, 2013).
Understanding of economics and finance is of course fundamental, but so is awareness of the issues in politics (and increasingly international politics) and economic sociology that frame the world in which accounting operates (e.g. Chapman et al., 2009) . Historical understanding of how accounting has evolved (e.g. Waymire & Basu, 2007) is also valuable in making sense of current and emerging issues -but it has to be good history (cf. Fleischman, 2009; Macve, 2013) . 15 
Concluding remarks
There have certainly been significant and accelerating changes in the approaches both to standard setting and to academic accounting research. When I took my final ICAEW Chartered Accountancy examinations in November 1971, the UK had only one accounting standard in force, the determination of the numbers in published accounts for the preceding 100 years or so having been left to (almost entirely secret) professional judgements, later aided by some Companies Act provisions and "recommendations" from ICAEW.
16 Now standard setting (including international auditing standards) is regarded as an integral part of the architecture of the global financial system, and many voices claim rights over and effectively influence its direction. As Allen & Ramanna (2013) point out these influences necessarily include the background education and experience of the standard setters themselves and thereby their own CFs (Zeff, 2013a) . Academic accounting has correspondingly mushroomed and its research agendas have become increasingly dominated, at least in the US, by capital markets based empirical research, complemented by developments in formal analytical modelling (e.g. Gao, 2013) . Glover (2013, p. 4) level engineers now to have mastered an understanding of how the world works (i.e. have positivist, research-based knowledge of the relevant theories and experimental observations of physics etc.) and thereby of how it might be possible to reshape it (and at what cost) for alternative given ends (a form of "practical reasoning" [e.g. Dennis, 2008] ). Similarly in medicine, but we also hope that the best of them will also be able to offer us some (necessarily contestable) vision of how choosing to achieve certain of those possibilities rather than others would make the world a better place (i.e. normative value judgements). Ideally these skills should be complementary not mutually exclusive. 19 And understanding of history has a valuable role to play here too. Yamey (1981) has reminded us that Francis Bacon (often credited as the inaugurator of the scientific method) observed in 1620 in The New Organion [Book One]:
Those who have handled sciences have been either men of experiment or men of dogmas. The men of experiment are like the ant, they only collect and use; the reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance. But the bee takes a middle course: it gathers its material from the flowers of the garden and of the field, but transforms and digests it by a power of its own. Not unlike this is the true business of philosophy; for it neither relies solely or chiefly on the powers of the mind, nor does it take the matter which it gathers from natural history and mechanical experiments and lay it up in the memory whole, as it finds it, but lays it up in the understanding altered and digested. Therefore from a closer and purer league between these two faculties, the experimental and the rational (such as has never yet been made), much may be hoped.
20
As inheritors of the subsequent relentless expansion of the scientific revolution, we cannot all now be "bees" and different researchers may be more suited to contributing to each kind of enquiry through a productive division of labour: but it is as well to keep the ideal of science (Bacon's "philosophy") in mind so that "a league can been made" between the positive and the normative to produce Bacon's "honey" of practical value. That would only leave the "communication gap" between academic researchers and accounting policy makers, such as standard setters, to be overcome (e.g. Singleton-Green, 2010) .
